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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2017, after years of opposition to a wind farm development on 
lands within the Osage Nation’s reservation in present-day northeastern 
Oklahoma, the Osage Minerals Council (“OMC” or “Council”) prevailed 
over its opponent in a decision issued by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Osage Wind, LLC.1  The 
respondents in that case, the single-purpose limited liability company, 
Osage Wind, LLC (“Osage Wind”), subsequently filed a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to review 
certain jurisdictional and canonical questions raised by the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision.  An amicus brief was later filed in the petition’s docket by the 
Solicitor General,2 who is often called upon in questions of Indian law to 
provide the federal government’s expertise and opinion on the matter at 
hand.3  The Supreme Court denied Osage Wind’s petition on January 7, 
2019.  
Although the Court ultimately chose to deny Osage Wind’s 
petition, it nevertheless seems prudent to conduct an analysis of the Osage 
Nation’s history of oil and gas development, and OMC’s resistance to any 
alternative energy development that could threaten its oil and gas assets.  
Ultimately, this paper seeks to inform renewable energy companies about 
the importance of understanding the trust relationship between the federal 
government and Indian nations, to address Indian nations’ concerns over 
renewable energy development projects through consultation, and to help 
provide an understanding of what energy sovereignty can mean for Indian 
nations and their economies.  Often, energy sovereignty involves Indian 
nations making their own decisions about which resources they use to 
promote economic development. 
                                                      
1.  871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (March 7, 
2018). 
2.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Osage Wind, LLC v. 
Osage Minerals Council, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
1237/74102/20181204150140415_17-1237 Osage Wind AC Pet.pdf  (U.S. Dec. 4, 
2018) (No. 17-1237).               
3.  Calls for the Views of the Solicitor General: An Obscure but 
Important Part of Supreme Court Practice, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/tre
nds/2016-2017/july-august-2017/calls-for-the-views-of-the-solicitor-general/ (Aug. 
25, 2017). 
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Part II provides necessary background information about the 
history of the Osage Nation after contact and briefly chronicles events 
leading up to and following the discovery of oil under its reservation lands.   
This historical context, including a brief examination of mismanagement 
and poor accounting practices on the part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”), gives insight into OMC’s opposition to recent renewable energy 
development within its reservation boundaries.  The Osage Nation’s vast 
mineral estate, the funds it generates for individuals with oil and gas 
interests, and the United States’ trust responsibility to protect those assets 
all contribute to the historical context needed to understand OMC’s 
clashes with renewable energy development companies.  
Part III examines the Osage Nation and OMC’s opposition to 
renewable energy development, including efforts to guard religious and 
spiritual interests, economic interests, and cultural interests, as well as the 
litigious history between Osage Wind, the United States as trustee of the 
Osage Nation’s mineral estate, and the Council.  The most recent decision 
in the dispute, United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, is a direct example of 
the Osage Nation’s attempt to protect its interests.  This case resulted in a 
broader meaning of the term “mineral development” as applicable when 
deciding whether an entity or individual is required to obtain a federally-
approved mining lease from the OMC prior to constructing turbines within 
reservation boundaries.  The parties’ briefs in the subsequent certiorari 
petition are also examined in Part III.  
The information in Parts II and III provides background to the 
discussion in Part IV, which briefly highlights the importance of 
meaningful dialogue with Indian nations when developing a renewable 
energy project within tribal reservation boundaries— taking into account 
individual tribal cultures and values— and how the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Osage Wind could affect renewable energy developers seeking 
to generate energy on tribal lands.  
 
II. THE RICHEST PEOPLE IN THE WORLD: THE HISTORY OF 
THE OSAGE NATION AFTER CONTACT 
 
Before discussing the Osage Nation’s renewable energy 
opposition, it is important to provide the necessary historical background 
surrounding the Osage Nation’s mineral estate.  This historical context 
adds perspective to the Osage Nation’s protection of its assets and other 
justifications for OMC’s opposition to wind farm development. 
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A. Discovery of Oil and Severance of the Estate: Osage Allotment Act 
 
Many factors contribute to the Osage Nation’s opposition to 
renewable energy development on its lands and tracing the Nation’s 
history from contact to present day provides insight into those extenuating 
circumstances.  The Osage Nation’s ancestral lands were primarily located 
throughout present-day Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, Missouri, and 
Illinois.4  In 1872, Congress, on behalf of the Osage, purchased land in 
Oklahoma with “so much of the proceeds . . . as were necessary” from the 
sale of lands in present-day Kansas ceded by the Osage in 1870.5  As such, 
the Osage Nation bought its own reservation, and was the only tribe to do 
so.6  After large oil deposits were discovered on these acquired lands 
decades later,7 the United States issued the first oil lease on the Osage 
reservation to Henry Foster on March 16, 1896 for a period of ten years.8  
When the Osage Allotment Act (the “Osage Act”) was passed in 
1906, the surface estate of the reservation land was severed from the 
mineral estate and divided into allotments.9   No single Osage member was 
given ownership over a portion of the mineral estate in the Osage Act; 
rather, the United States holds the entire mineral estate in trust for the 
                                                      
4.  See Ancestral Map, THE OSAGE NATION, https://www.osagenation-
nsn.gov/who-we-are/historic-preservation/ancestral-map (last visited March 24, 
2018). 
5.  Act of June 5, 1872, Ch. 310, 17 Stat. 228. 
6.  Final Evaluation Report: BIA Needs Sweeping Changes to Manage 
the Osage Nation’s Energy Resources, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 
CR-EV-BIA-0002-2013, at 45 (Dep’t of Interior Oct. 20, 2014), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/CR-EV-BIA-0002-2013Public1.pdf  
[hereinafter Inspector General Final Report, Sweeping Changes]. 
7.  DAVID GRANN, KILLERS OF THE FLOWER MOON: THE OSAGE 
MURDERS AND THE BIRTH OF THE FBI 6 (2017). 
8.  Inspector General Final Report, Sweeping Changes, supra note 6, at 
45; News: Did You Know? THE OSAGE NATION, https://www.osagenation-
nsn.gov/news-events/news/did-you-know (last visited March 24, 2018). 
9.  Act of June 28, 1906, Ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539, 539–45 [hereinafter, 
Osage Act]. Because the Osage land in Oklahoma was purchased in accordance with 
the 1870 treaty, the Osage Nation’s lands were excluded from the General Allotment 
Act of 1887 and were only allotted after agreement by the Osage Nation in 1906. 
Oklahoma Indian Tribe Education Guide, OKLAHOMA STATE DEP’T OF EDUCATION, 
at 3, http://sde.ok.gov/sde/sites/ok.gov.sde/files/documents/files/Tribesof_OK_ 
Education%20Guide_Osage_Nation.pdf  (last visited March 24, 2018). 
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Osage Nation.10  Those Osage members whose names were listed on the 
tribal roll as recorded with the Osage Agency11 at the time of the Osage 
Act were each given a “headright” share of the royalty revenues from the 
mineral estate.12  A single headright was given to each of the 2,229 Osage 
members listed on the roll, 13 and those headright shares “can only be 
inherited.”14  Presently, of the original 2,229 headrights owned by Osage 
members under the Osage Act, most Osage descendants do not own 
headrights, and receive no portion of the royalties payments, while others 
have multiple headrights or fractionalized interests in many different 
headrights; some headrights are owned by non-Osage peoples. 15   The 
Osage Act, in § 4, set up a trust account for the Osage Nation, which holds 
all the trust funds of the tribe, including royalties paid on its oil and gas 
leases.16  The Osage trust account also includes those funds leftover from 
                                                      
10.  Osage Act, supra note 9, at § 4, 34 Stat. at 544. The Osage Act 
originally contained a twenty-five-year expiration date on the United States’ trustee 
status over the Osage mineral estate. However, that expiration date was ultimately 
eliminated in 1978, and the United States’ trusteeship continues “in perpetuity.” 
Fletcher v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1357 (N.D. Okla. 2015) (quoting Act 
of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-496, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 1660). 
11.  The Osage Agency is headed by a Superintendent and operates within 
the Eastern Oklahoma Regional Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Regional 
Offices are responsible for administering program services to agencies located within 
their region. See Indian Affairs, Regional Offices, BIA U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
https://www.bia.gov/regional-offices (last visited March 24, 2018). 
12.  Osage Act, supra note 9, § 3, 34 Stat. at 543–44; see also Inspector 
General Final Report, Sweeping Changes, supra note 6, at 3, 45.  
13.  Louise Red Corn, $380 Million Expected in Federal Osage Trust 
Case Settlement, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 28, 2011), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/million-expected-in-federal-osage-trust-case-
settlement/article_13da2ffb-e7b8-57b2-b0a5-5f56511c991f.html [hereinafter, Louise 
Red Corn, $380 Million]. 
14.  Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Cautionary Tale of the Osage Indian 
Nation Attempt to Survive its Wealth, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 815, 817 (1999); see 
also Louise Red Corn, $380 Million, supra note 13 (“In 1978, the U.S. Congress made 
it illegal to permanently transfer headrights from an Osage to any non-Osage person 
or entity.”). 
15.  Fletcher v. United States, 153 F.Supp.3d 1354, 1357 (N.D. Okla. 
2015) (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 311 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds. 2005)). 
16.  Osage Act, supra note 9, at § 4, 34 Stat. at 544; see also Osage Nation 
v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 392, 393 (2003). 
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the sale of present-day Kansas land and subsequent purchase of the Osage 
reservation.17  The mineral royalties in the Osage trust account, along with 
accrued interest and land payments, are distributed quarterly to those 
individuals with headright shares on a pro rata division basis.18  Individual 
Indian Money Accounts are trust accounts for Osage tribal members who 
have a headright interest or receive income from an individual trust or 
restricted asset.19  
 It was headrights and the abundance of oil underneath the Osage 
lands that led to the Osage being described “as the richest people in the 
world.”20  In an 1899 letter to the Governor of Oklahoma, the United States 
Indian Agent assigned to the Osage Nation stated:  
 
They not only own 1,400,000 acres of land but have to 
their credit in the United States Treasury nearly 
$9,000,000. From the interest on this fund they are paid 
by the agent $200 per capita, per annum, in quarterly 
installments. In fact, they receive so much money that 
they do but little work and employ white people to do their 
farming and other work for them.21 
 
 While many Osage members enjoyed the wealth that oil discovery 
afforded them, others, particularly non-Indians, expressed jealously over 
the Osages’ new luxurious lifestyle.  Newspaper articles written about the 
Osage provide evidence of this envy, stating, “We have set up an Indian 
nobility in the United States, with rare privileges . . . They scorn work, live 
                                                      
17.  Osage Nation, 57 Fed. Cl. at 393 (citing Treaty with the Osage 
Indians, U.S.-Osage Tribe, art. 1, Sept. 29, 1865, 14 Stat. 687). 
18.  Osage Act, supra note 9, at § 4, 34 Stat. at 544. 
19.  25 C.F.R. § 115.002 (2014) (“As used in this part: Account holder 
means a tribe or a person who owns the funds in a tribal or Individual Indian Money 
(IIM) account that is maintained by the Secretary. Account mean a record of trust 
funds that is maintained by the Secretary for the benefit of a tribe or a person.”). 
20.  Letter from William J. Pollock, U.S. Indian Agent, to C.M. Barnes, 
Governor of Okla., Annual Reports of the Dep’t of the Interior for the Fiscal Year 
Ended June 30, 1899: Miscellaneous Reports, Part II 739 (Oct. 1, 1899).  
21.  Id. 
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in villages, and enjoy all the frivolities and dissipations.” 22   Acts of 
violence against those Osage members with interests in headright shares 
became commonplace. 23  Author David Grann quoted Osage historian 
Louis F. Burns as saying, “I don’t know of a single Osage family which 
didn’t lose at least one family member because of the headrights.”24    
The passage of the Osage Act in 1906 led to the promulgation of 
regulations applicable only to the Osage Nation.25  As such, 25 C.F.R. part 
214 is titled “Leasing of Osage Reservation Lands, Oklahoma, for Mining, 
Except Oil and Gas.”  Another applicable regulation, 25 C.F.R. part 226, 
is titled “Leasing of Osage Reservation Lands for Oil and Gas Mining,” 
and allows OMC, on behalf of the Osage Nation, to enter into oil and gas 
mining leases with approval from the Secretary of the Interior.26  OMC has 
its own colorful history in relation to the Osage Nation.  In 2006, the Osage 
Nation reformed its government, and adopted a Constitution allowing 
membership and voting rights to all Osage, not just those with headright 
shares.27  Since the Osage Constitution was passed, disagreement over 
whether the Osage Nation and all its members, or OMC and its headrights 
holders, own the Osage mineral estate.28  
 
B.  Mismanagement and Poor Accounting Practices of BIA 
 
To illustrate the importance the Osage Nation places on protecting 
its assets, a brief analysis of the Osage Nation’s, and other Indian nations’, 
                                                      
22.  An Indian Nobility, THE MORNING PRESS (Santa Barbara, CA), Dec. 
10, 1898, at 4, https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=MP18981210.2.20&srpos=1&e=-------
en--20--1--txt-txIN-an+indian+nobility-------1. 
23.  See generally GRANN, supra note 7. 
24.  Id. at 283. 
25.  Inspector General Final Report, Sweeping Changes, supra note 6, at 
45. See also Osage Act, supra note 9, at § 3, 34 Stat. at 544 (“ . . . and leases for all 
oil, gas, and other minerals . . . may be made by the Osage tribe . . . with the approval 
of the Secretary of the Interior, and under such rules and regulations as he [or she] 
may prescribe.”). 
26.  Osage Act, supra note 9, at § 3, 34 Stat. at 543. 
27.  Shannon Shaw Duty, Osage Minerals Council Rescinds Resolution 
to Sue the Osage Nation, OSAGE NEWS (Nov. 17, 2017), 
http://osagenews.org/en/article/2017/11/17/osage-minerals-council-rescinds-
resolution-sue-osage-nation/.  
28.  Id. 
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attempts to hold the BIA accountable for its mismanagement of tribal trust 
assets is essential.  Prior to and following the passage of the Osage Act in 
1906, there have been accusations of mismanagement of trust accounts of 
various Indian nations on the part of the Department of the Interior 
(“DOI”),29 its Secretaries,30 the BIA,31 and the Commissioners of Indian 
Affairs. 32   In a 1915 report to Congress, the Joint Commission to 
Investigate Indian Affairs provided:  
                                                      
29.  Oversight Hearing on Indian Trust Management Practices in the 
Department of the Interior, Joint Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs and the 
S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 106th Cong. 39–40 (1999) [hereinafter, Oversight 
Hearing on Indian Trust Management Practices] (statement of Paul Homan, Homan 
& Associates) (“When the Department of the Interior can no longer be trusted—and I 
share this view—to keep and produce trust records which are conditions precedent to 
the proper administration of its trust responsibilities to Indian beneficiaries, it is time 
to consider alternatives to the Department’s future management of these important 
trust activities.”). 
30.  John F. Fialka, Babbitt, Rubin are Cited for Contempt by Judge in 
Indian Trust-Fund Case, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 23, 1999, 12:01 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB919706523326337500. This article discusses U.S. 
District Judge Royce Lamberth’s decision to cite Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt 
and Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin for contempt of court, “for repeatedly failing 
to produce records in a case involving American Indian trust funds.” Id. The article 
quotes Judge Lamberth’s “blistering” opinion: “Secretary Babbitt’s ‘inattention to 
detail and wholesale delegation of authority to individuals . . . may cause him future 
problems with this court if the government misconduct continues.’” Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
31.  See Oversight Hearing on Indian Trust Management Practices, supra 
note 29, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell) (“I would like to direct 
your attention to the photographs around the hearing room . . . . They came from a 
1993 report on the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ recordkeeping procedures and were taken 
at a number of different BIA offices. These photographs show trust fund documents 
mixed with all kinds of other documents to be kept by the field offices . . . . They’re 
water damaged, kept in trash bags, disintegrating boxes, next to paint cans, mop 
buckets, street signs, mice droppings on them, and so on.”); Office of the Inspector 
General, Audit Report: Accounting Controls Over Tribal Trust Funds, Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, i (Sept. 29, 1983), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/T-0066.pdf (“[T]he Bureau has five systems 
involved in trust fund accounting, which is four too many.”); Joint Comm’n to 
Investigate Indian Affairs, Report of the Joint Commission to Investigate Indian 
Affairs, H.R. Doc. 1669, at 4 (1915). 
32.  Comm. on Expenditures in the Interior Dep’t, Report in the Matter of 
the Investigation of the Indian Bureau, H.R. Rep. No. 1279, at 4 (1913) (discussing 
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It appears that Congress has heretofore enacted laws 
requiring the payment to the Osage Indians . . . enormous 
funds derived from royalties and otherwise. This has 
resulted in the grossest frauds and extortions. The 
evidence shows that it is the universal practice of white 
persons who loan money to the Osage Indians to charge 
usurious rates of interest, ranging from 40 per cent per 
annum to as high, in at least one instance, as 10,220 per 
cent.33 
 
 In October 2011, the United States and the Osage Nation entered 
into a settlement agreement for $380 million, ending more than a decade 
of litigation regarding mismanagement and poor accounting of the Osage 
trust accounts on the part of the United States. 34   The Osage Nation 
brought two suits in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in 1999 and 2000, 
which “included numerous motions, extensive discovery, many rulings, 
and two trials over [twelve] years.”35  The Court had previously awarded 
the Osage roughly $331 million in two judgments for claims asserted by 
the Tribe between 1972 and 2000.36  The Osage Nation’s continued desire 
to protect the assets and revenues yielded from its mineral estate and land 
holdings is evidenced by repeated assertions and claims—made by Osage 
                                                      
the removal of Comm’r of Indian Affairs Robert G. Valentine, the investigation 
revealed “to a large extent moneys appropriated for the Indian service have been 
illegally, improperly, and extravagantly expended under Mr. Valentine’s 
administration.”). 
33.  Joint Comm’n to Investigate Indian Affairs, Report of the Joint 
Commission to Investigate Indian Affairs, H.R. Doc. 1669, at 8 (1915).   
34.  Justice News, United States and Osage Tribe Announce $380 Million 
Settlement of Tribal Trust Lawsuit, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-and-osage-tribe-announce-380-million-
settlement-tribal-trust-lawsuit (October 21, 2011). 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
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officials and others in congressional hearings,37 reports,38 and lawsuits39—
that the United States was mismanaging tribal trust accounts for decades. 
 
III. WIND FARM OPPOSITION: OSAGE NATION’S ASSERTION 
OF SOVEREIGNTY AND PROTECTION OF INTERESTS 
 
 The exercise of energy sovereignty by the Osage, and protection 
of assets from competition, stems from a history and tradition of fighting 
                                                      
37.  See Oversight Hearing on Indian Trust Management Practices, supra 
note 29, at 37 (statement of Charles Tillman, Chief, Osage Nation) (“I’ve come here 
to ask you and this committee to help us, the tribes out there in the west, to help us 
solve these [trust fund] problems. Somebody has got to bird-dog these people and 
stand over them and make them do what’s right. That’s all we’re asking here—to do 
what is right.”). 
38.  Report to the Comm. on Indian Affairs: BIA’s Tribal Trust Fund 
Account Reconciliation Results, U.S. General Accounting Office, Report No. B-
266127, at 4–5 (GAO May 3, 1996), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/222488.pdf  
(“Although BIA identified about 20,000 boxes of accounting documents and lease 
records and spent about 5 years attempting to reconcile tribal trust accounts, sufficient 
records were not available to fully reconcile the accounts. For example, BIA’s 
reconciliation contractor verified 218,531 of tribes’ noninvestment receipt and 
disbursement transactions totaling $15.3 billion, or 86 percent, of the $17.7 billion in 
transactions that were recorded in the general ledger. However, due to missing records, 
the contractor was not able to verify 32,901 of these transactions totaling $2.4 billion 
(gross). In addition, BIA was not able to determine the total amount of receipts and 
disbursements that should have been recorded and had no reconciliation procedure to 
address the completeness of accounting records.”). 
39.  Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 592, 667 (1951) 
(“In view of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record and the historical 
facts of which we take judicial notice, relating to the fair value of the lands in question, 
we are of the opinion that the finding of the [Indian Claims] Commission that the fair 
value of the lands was not in excess of the sum of $300,000 paid therefor, is not 
supported by substantial evidence. We are further of the opinion that the price of 34 
cents an acre paid was unconscionable consideration for such lands.”); Osage Nation 
v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 392, 393–94 (2003) (“Plaintiff further contends that 
defendant ‘has exercised involuntary, pervasive management and complete control 
over the mineral assets of the Osage,’ but has ‘never rendered to [plaintiff] an 
accounting . . . of the Osage assets held by [defendant].’” (internal citations omitted)); 
Osage Nation v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 244, 253 (2005) (ordering the federal 
government to turn over certain documents in discovery which concerned 
mismanagement of trust funds).  
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for the productive use of the Osage mineral estate and guarding of the 
royalties and financial stability it provides.  The following section gives 
guidance on present-day actions the Osage Nation, and OMC, have taken 
to protect the Nation’s stake in oil and gas production.  
 
A. Religious, Economic, and Health Concerns and the Osage 
Nation’s Wind Farm Opposition 
 
The Osage Nation’s current Principal Chief, Geoffrey Standing 
Bear, has cited many reasons for the Osage opposition to wind farm 
development within its reservation boundaries.  Chief Standing Bear’s 
reasons include spiritual, economic, health, and quality of life concerns, as 
well  the impact industrial wind farms could have on natural habitats and 
wildlife.40  In an article written for the Oklahoma newspaper Tulsa World, 
Chief Standing Bear made a case for why the Osage Nation was against 
the wind farm constructed by Osage Wind.41  As to spiritual and religious 
concerns, the Osage Chief stated that “suffice it to say the horizon is a very 
important spiritual element for the Osage.”42  The Osage believe that a 
clear, unobstructed view of the horizon is essential, because “the horizon 
is a sacred place where the gates of heaven are open at sunrise and 
sunset.”43  Another article quotes Chief Standing Bear as asserting that 
“[r]oughly 14,000 [oil] wells still dot the landscape.  And no, they aren’t 
exactly beautiful . . . . And yes, they have undoubtedly caused some 
pollution.  But nothing compares to the ‘scenic blight’ of nearly 100 
gigantic wind turbines towering above the prairie.”44  
Chief Standing Bear’s stated health concerns included 
unreferenced “[s]tudies show[ing] wind farms may cause problems such 
                                                      
40.  Geoffrey M. Standing Bear, Business Viewpoint with Osage Chief 
Standing Bear: Wind Farms Cause Cultural, Economic Damage, TULSA WORLD 
(April 22, 2017), http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/businessviewpoint/business-
viewpoint-with-osage-chief-standing-bear-wind-farms-cause/article_b18980bb-
d5c3-5f7d-aaf4-7fe1a20ef36c.html [hereinafter, Standing Bear, Business Viewpoint]. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Michael Overall, Osage Nation Prays for the End of Wind 
Developments, TULSA WORLD (July 12, 2015), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/osage-nation-prays-for-the-end-of-wind-
developments/article_278a9e60-9446-5451-aec3-4610c11fc4fa.html. 
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as dizziness, hearing issues, nausea, stress, heart issues, sleep deprivation, 
vertigo, and other complications.”45  Blaming these health concerns on the 
wind turbines’ “infrasound emissions,” Chief Standing Bear suggested 
that the turbines’ effects were more onerous than mere inconvenience and 
unattractiveness.46  
The Osage Nation’s economic concerns about industrial wind 
farm development center around the wind farms’ supposed lack of 
financial sustainability without Oklahoma tax credits.47  While those tax 
credits previously enjoyed a sunset date of January 1, 2021, 48  Chief 
Standing Bear has praised Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin and members 
of the Oklahoma legislature for the passage of HB 2298, a bill that moved 
up the expiration date of the wind farm facilities’ tax credits to July 1, 
2017.49  Under HB 2298, those wind farms that wished to qualify for the 
zero-emissions tax credit were required to be fully operational by the 
revised July 1, 2017 date. 50   However, the Oklahoma legislature 
introduced a bill in February of 2018 to end the credit entirely.51  The 
author of the bill, Representative Bobby Cleveland, stated it was vital to 
end the tax credit for wind farms because “[t]he government is not [the 
wind farms’] sugar daddy, no matter how hard the wind industry may 
wish.”52  According to Osage Chief Standing Bear, those tax credits are 
subsidizing wind companies, “most of which are not Oklahoma-based and 
                                                      
45.  Standing Bear, Business Viewpoint, supra note 40. 
46.  Id. For an article discussing the origins of the belief that infrasound 
emissions are dangerous, see Philip Jaekl, Why People Believe Low-Frequency Sound 
is Dangerous, THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science 
/archive/2017/06/wind-turbine-syndrome/530694/. 
47.  Standing Bear, Business Viewpoint, supra note 40. 
48.  Paul Monies, Oklahoma Governor Signs Bills to End Wind Incentive, 
Airfield Loophole, NEWS OK (Apr. 18, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5545841  
[hereinafter, Paul Monies, Oklahoma Governor Signs Bills]. 
49.  Standing Bear, Business Viewpoint, supra note 40. 
50.  An Act Relating to Income Tax Credits, H.R.  2298, 56th Leg., 1st 
Sess. § 1(A)(1) (Okla. 2017). 
51. An Act Relating to Revenue and Taxation, H.B. 2908, 56th Leg., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2018). 
52.  Joy Hampton, Bill Would Eliminate Renewable Energy Credit, THE 
NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.normantranscript.com/news/ 
government/bill-would-eliminate-renewable-energy-credit/article_32a233f5-a094-
5a0b-8cf5-aa209028a039.html. 
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at least one is not even U.S.-based.” 53   Others opposing wind farm 
developments have called for a production tax on wind generation, 
“similar to that levied on oil and natural gas development, to ensure 
[Oklahoma] does not continue enriching [oil and gas] competitors at the 
expense of its taxpayers.” 54   A recent study by the Oklahoma Policy 
Institute found that while wind industry subsidies have risen over the last 
several years, the wind subsidies “pale in comparison to those [subsidies] 
the state provides to oil and gas producers.”55  This fact illustrates the 
situation many renewable energy developers face when attempting to 
penetrate the Oklahoma energy market, which often favors oil and gas 
interests.  
Regardless of the end of Oklahoma’s wind energy subsidies, the 
legislative findings in the Oklahoma Wind Energy Act have remained 
intact: “(1) Oklahoma’s wind energy resources are an important asset for 
the continued economic growth of the state and for the provision of clean 
and renewable power to both the people of the state and the nation as a 
whole;” and “(2) Promotion of the development of wind energy resources 
is important to the economic growth of the state.” 56   Also intact are 
Oklahoma’s tax credit incentives for “utility-scale solar, geothermal, and 
other zero-emissions technologies until Jan. 1, 2021.”57  Despite efforts to 
propagate negative press about Oklahoma’s wind energy market, recent 
data ranks Oklahoma as the second-highest state in the nation for wind 
capacity.58  
                                                      
53.  Standing Bear, Business Viewpoint, supra note 40. 
54.  Paul Monies, Oklahoma Governor Signs Bills, supra note 48 (quoting 
Cliff Branan, executive director for the Windfall Coalition). 
55.  David Blatt, Oklahoma’s Wind Subsidies are Dwarfed by Subsidies 
to the Oil and Gas Industry, OKLAHOMA POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://okpolicy.org/oklahomas-wind-subsidies-dwarfed-subsidies-oil-gas-industry/. 
56.  17 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 160.12(1)-(2) (West 2018). Interestingly, 
the third legislative finding holds that “[t]he prudent development of wind energy 
resources requires addressing the relationship of the needs of wind energy developers 
with those of the mineral estate owners who have the historical right to make 
reasonable use of the surface estate.” Id. 
57.  Paul Monies, Oklahoma Governor Signs Bills, supra note 48. 
58.  Jack Money, Oklahoma Moves Into No. 2 Spot for Wind Power 
Capacity in the Nation, Association Says, NEWS OK (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://newsok.com/article/5581518/oklahoma-moves-into-no.-2-spot-for-wind-
power-capacity-in-the-nation-association-says. 
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These policies and practices show that, notwithstanding the Osage 
Nation’s expressed concerns about the economic stability of wind energy 
investments, the state of Oklahoma is still committed to the development 
of renewable energy.  A brief outline of the wind farm industry in 
Oklahoma, coupled with stated Osage Nation concerns, provides further 
evidence of the Nation’s varied approach to its opposition of wind farm 
development.  Additionally, it shows the power of oil and gas industry 
interests in Oklahoma compared to renewable energy developers. 
 
B. Protecting Oil and Gas Interests: Osage Nation Wind Farm 
Opposition 
 
Conspicuously absent from Chief Standing Bear’s list of 
objections to wind farm development was the protection of the Osage 
Nation’s oil and gas interests.  However, OMC Chairman Everett Waller 
has made clear it is not the nature of wind projects and renewable energy 
that has created the Osage Nation’s opposition to wind farm 
development.59  Rather, Waller says, “I have a job as chairman of the 
Minerals Council to protect my shareholders. This is a business. We’re in 
the oil business.” 60   Restated, it seems Waller has nothing personally 
against wind energy development, except the interference that 
development could have on Osage oil and gas assets.  This statement 
shows where the Osage loyalties (and royalties) lie: protection of its oil 
and gas assets and the headright holders who benefit from them.  
 
1. Osage Wind I 
 
OMC’s commitment to the protection of its oil and gas assets and 
the Osage mineral estate’s headright owners was apparent in the Osage 
Nation’s 2011 lawsuit against Wind Capital Group, LLC.  In Osage Nation 
ex rel. Osage Minerals Council v. Wind Capital Group, LLC,61 the Tribe 
sought a permanent injunction against the construction of a 94-turbine 
                                                      
59.  Joe Wertz, Why Oklahoma’s Wind Energy Future Could be Shaped 
by Osage County, STATE IMPACT (July 24, 2014, 6:15 AM), 
https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2014/07/24/why-oklahomas-wind-energy-
future-could-be-shaped-by-osage-county/. 
60.  Id. 
61.  2011 WL 6371384 (N.D. Okla. 2011) [hereinafter Osage Wind I]. 
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wind farm by the Wind Capital Group, LLC, and its subsidiary, Osage 
Wind (collectively, “Wind Capital Group”), on privately-owned surface 
lands within the Osage Nation’s reservation boundaries. 62   Seven 
landowners leased approximately 8,500 acres of surface estate to Wind 
Capital Group for a wind farm development that was originally scheduled 
to begin in November of 2011.63  
The Osage Nation contended the construction of the wind farm 
would obstruct oil and gas lessees’ access to the mineral estate.64  Citing 
25 C.F.R. § 226.19, the Osage Nation argued that installation of “94 
turbines, underground collection lines running between turbines and to a 
substation, one overhead transmission line, two permanent meteorological 
towers, and a network of access roads”65 would block oil and gas lessees’ 
legal right to access surface lands “as may be reasonable for operations 
and marketing.” 66   The construction of the wind farm on the Osage 
Nation’s lands was scheduled to take nine to twelve months to complete.67  
The district court organized its findings of fact into four sections 
corresponding to the four elements a plaintiff must prove in order to 
receive a permanent injunction.68  The district court ultimately disagreed 
with the Osage Nation’s contentions and cited the Tribe’s lack of evidence 
showing there would be an “actual or potential conflict” between the 
construction of the wind farm and the oil and gas lessees’ access to the 
mineral estate.69  Also of concern for the court was the harm a permanent 
injunction could have on surface owners who leased their land to Wind 
Capital Group, with expectations of receiving payments on those leases 
throughout their twenty-year duration. 70   In its conclusions, the court 
ultimately held “[t]he mere possibility that a dispute might arise in the 
                                                      
62.  Id. at *1, *2. 
63.  Id. at *1. 
64.  Id. at *1, *2. 
65.  Id. at *1. 
66.  25 C.F.R. § 226.19 (2014). 
67.  Osage Wind I, 2011 WL at *2.  
68.  Id. at *1 n. 1 (“[T]o prevail on its request for a permanent injunction, 
the Tribe must prove (1) success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) the harm to 
the Tribe outweighs the harm the injunction would cause the defendants; and (4) the 
injunction would not adversely affect the public interest.”). 
69.  Id.  
70.  Id. 
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future [was] insufficient to merit an injunction of the Wind Farm’s 
construction and operation.”71 
 While litigation was ongoing in 2011 with Wind Capital Group, 
OMC continued with sales of mineral leases, as authorized in 25 C.F.R. § 
226.2.72  In February of 2011, OMC sold a total of 12,480 acres in leases 
for $913,150.73  The majority of the acreage and payments were for oil and 
gas leases, with 12,320 acres leased for $910,400.  The remainder of those 
leases concerned solely oil, with 160 acres leased for $2,750.74  For the 
fiscal years of 2010 and 2011, the oil and gas royalties generated a 
combined $224 million.75 
 After the court issued its ruling in December 2011, the Wind 
Capital Group released a statement emphasizing the company’s 
willingness to work with the Osage Nation to create economic 
development opportunities for all residing in Osage County, because “the 
development of energy sources above and beneath the surface lands of 
Osage County can co-exist.”76  Then-Principal Chief John Red Eagle’s 
post-ruling statement was not as conciliatory.  His concern mainly 
centered around detrimental effects the ruling could have on headright 
holders and the Nation’s assets because of the “significant impact on the 
individual incomes of those who receive oil and gas royalties in Osage 
County” and the “adverse impact on the tribe’s ability to develop its 
mineral estate.”77  The next major litigation between the parties is detailed 
below. 
 
 
 
                                                      
71.  Id. at *9 (emphasis in original). 
72.  Minerals Council has Another Lucrative Lease Sale, OSAGE NEWS 
(Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.osagenews.org/en/article/2011/02/24/minerals-council-
has-another-lucrative-lease-sale/. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Inspector General Final Report, Sweeping Changes, supra note 6, at 
3. 
76.  Benny Polacca, Federal Judge Rules Against Osage Nation in Wind 
Farm Fight, OSAGE NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.osagenews.org/en/article/2011/12/16/federal-judge-rules-against-osage-
nation-wind-farm-fight/. 
77.  Id. 
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2. Osage Wind II 
 
United States v. Osage Wind, LLC 78  documents the Osage 
Nation’s continued efforts to inhibit development of a wind farm within 
its reservation boundaries.  After the ruling in Osage Nation ex rel. Osage 
Minerals Council in late 2011, Osage Wind began site preparation for the 
wind farm construction in October 2013, and began the excavating 
groundwork necessary to construct the wind turbines in September 2014.79   
Upon commencement of the excavation work, the United States, acting as 
trustee on behalf of the Osage Nation, filed suit against Osage Wind in 
November 2014 in federal district court.80  The United States sought to 
enjoin the company from conducting its excavation activities because of 
Osage Wind’s failure to obtain a tribally-issued, federally-approved 
mining lease under 25 C.F.R. § 214.7.81  The United States and Osage 
Nation contended that the excavation work for the wind turbines’ cement 
foundations constituted “mining” under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 82  because 
Osage Wind extracted “soil, sand and rock of varying sizes . . . of a 
common mineral variety.”83  The violation of leasing requirements, the 
United States argued, occurred when Osage Wind sorted the excavated 
rock pieces by size, crushed the pieces smaller than three feet, and then 
packed those crushed pieces back into the hole after the pouring of 
foundations “measuring ten feet deep and up to 60 feet in diameter.”84  
Soon after the United States filed suit, however, the excavation work for 
the wind turbines was completed, with the cement foundations for each 
turbine poured.85  
                                                      
78.  871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Osage Wind II]. 
79.  Id. at 1083. 
80. Id. 
81.  Id. See United States v. Osage Wind, LLC, 2015 WL 5775378, *2 
(N.D. Okla. 2015). 
82.  25 C.F.R. § 211.3 defines “mining” as “the science, technique, and 
business of mineral development including, but not limited to: opencast work, 
underground work, and in-situ leaching directed to severance and treatment of 
minerals; Provided, when sand, gravel, pumice, cinders, granite, building stone, 
limestone, clay or silt is the subject mineral, and enterprise is considered “mining” 
only if the extraction of such a mineral exceeds 5,000 cubic years in any given year.” 
83. Osage Wind II, 871 F.3d at 1083. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 1083–84. 
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The United States then withdrew its initial injunction request 
against Osage Wind, and chose to amend its complaint to request damages 
because the failure to obtain a mining lease constituted “unauthorized 
extraction of reserved minerals.”86  The district court disagreed with the 
United States’ contentions, and issued a summary judgment award to 
Osage Wind because “the definition of mining necessarily involves the 
commercialization of mineral materials, i.e., the sale of minerals,” and 
Osage Wind did not commercialize the minerals it extracted to build its 
turbines’ foundations.87  The United States did not inform OMC that it did 
not plan to appeal the district court judgment until the final day of the 60-
day appeal deadline, so OMC was forced to file both a motion to intervene 
and, within minutes, a notice of appeal on the last permissible day.88  The 
district court then denied the motion to intervene, citing a lack of 
jurisdiction because of the merits appeal.89  OMC appealed the district 
court’s denial of the motion to intervene, leaving the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to decide two threshold issues— OMC’s 
right to appeal and Osage Wind’s res judicata defense— along with one 
merits issue, the meaning of “mineral development” as referenced in the 
definition of “mining” in 25 C.F.R. § 211.3.90 
The Tenth Circuit initially dealt with the two threshold issues 
raised by Osage Wind.91  First, although OMC was not formally a party to 
the underlying lawsuit, its interests had been protected by the United 
States, acting as its trustee.92  The Tenth Circuit held that OMC qualified 
as “would-be appellants” with a “sufficiently ‘unique interest’” in the 
underlying suit,93 bringing it within the narrow exception to the general 
rule that only those who are originally, or properly become, parties in an 
underlying suit may appeal a judgment.94  Because it held that OMC had 
properly appealed the district court judgment, the Tenth Circuit dismissed 
                                                      
86.  Id. at 1084. 
87.  Id. at 1089 (emphasis in original). 
88.  Id. at 1084. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id.  
92.  Id.  
93.  Id. (quoting Plain v. Murphy Family Farms, 296 F.3d 975, 979 (10th 
Cir. 2002)). 
94.  Id. (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per curiam)). 
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as moot the question of whether OMC’s motion to intervene in the district 
court was proper.95  
The second threshold issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit was 
whether Osage Wind had, after raising the affirmative defense of res 
judicata, met its burden of proving that OMC could have raised its 
“mineral development” argument in its 2011 suit, Osage Nation ex rel. 
Osage Minerals Council.96  OMC argued its claims would not have been 
ripe during the 2011 lawsuit because the extent of Osage Wind’s 
excavation activities were unknown at that time.97  The court agreed with 
OMC, and held its claims were not precluded by the res judicata doctrine.98  
The Tenth Circuit then moved to the merits issue: whether Osage 
Wind’s extraction, arranging by size, crushing, and back-filling activities 
constituted “mineral development” under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3’s definition 
of mining, therefore requiring a federally-approved lease from OMC.99  
The court applied an Indian law judicial canon of construction100 to its 
interpretative and textual analysis of § 211.3.101  Because the purpose of 
25 C.F.R. part 211 was to protect Indian mineral owners who lease their 
interests for development, and to ensure that those resources “will be 
developed in a manner that maximizes [the Indian mineral owner’s] best 
economic interests and minimizes any adverse environmental [or cultural] 
impacts,”102 the court felt it was appropriate to adopt a reading of § 211.3 
that favored the Osage Nation, “liberally constru[ing]” the regulation in 
OMC’s favor.103  The Tenth Circuit ultimately held as too narrow the 
                                                      
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. at 1086–87. 
97.  Id. at 1087. 
98.  Id.  
99.  Id. 
100.  “The basic Indian law canons of construction require that treaties, 
agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the 
Indians, and that all ambiguities are to be resolved in their favor. Additionally, treaties 
and agreements are to be construed as the Indians would have understood them, and 
tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s intent to the 
contrary is clear and unambiguous.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 
2.02[1], at 113–14 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter, COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK]. 
101.  Osage Wind II, 871 F.3d at 1090. 
102.  25 C.F.R. § 211.1 (2018).  
103.  Osage Wind II, 871 F.3d at 1090. 
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district court’s ruling that “mineral development” under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 
must be done for commercial purposes in order to trigger the need for a 
mining lease from OMC.104  
While litigation in United States v. Osage Wind, LLC spanned 
from 2014 to the present, the mineral estate continued to generate vast 
royalties paid to Osage headright holders.  In a 2014 report, the Office of 
the Inspector General published issues with the BIA’s (and the underlying 
Osage Agency’s) mismanagement of the Osage Nation’s oil and gas 
resources.105  According to this report, as of 2014, the Osage Nation had 
4,453 oil and gas leases with close to 14,500 producing wells, with 
expectations of another 7,500 wells to be drilled between the fiscal years 
2012 and 2027. 106   The estimated royalties generated by the Osage 
Nation’s oil and gas leases during this time frame is $13.6 billion.107  The 
latest quarterly report, posted by OMC in June 2017, revealed the total 
revenue for the second quarter of 2017 (the months of April to June) was 
more than $8.2 million dollars, with each headright holder’s payment 
totaling $3,945 for the second quarter.108  
The Tenth Circuit’s decision to reverse and remand the suit in 
United States v. Osage Wind, LLC made it possible for OMC to pursue 
damages against Osage Wind for its failure to obtain a federally-approved 
mining lease.109  Osage Wind subsequently filed a petition for certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court on March 2, 2018.110 
 
 
                                                      
104.  Id. at 1092. 
105.  Inspector General Final Report, Sweeping Changes, supra note 6, at 
1. 
106.  Id. at 3. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Third Osage Minerals Council, Quarterly Report—June 2017, 
OSAGE MINERALS COUNCIL NEWSLETTER, Summer 2017, at 2. 
109.  Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, Wind Companies Appeal to U.S. Supreme 
Court after 10th Circuit Rules in Favor of the Osage, OSAGE NEWS (March 13, 2018), 
http://www.osagenews.org/en/article/2018/03/13/wind-companies-appeal-us-
supreme-court-after-10th-circuit-rules-favor-osage/. 
110.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Osage Wind, LLC v. United States, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171237/37360/20180302123736247_
Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf (U.S. March 2, 2018) (No. 17-
1237). 
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3. Moving Forward: Petition for Certiorari 
 
In its petition to the Supreme Court, Osage Wind111 presented two 
questions for resolution: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction over 
the appeal filed by OMC was correct, given that OMC was not a party in 
the district court proceedings; and (2) whether invocation of an Indian law 
canon of construction overrode the plain language and congressional 
intent behind 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 and deprived the surface landowners of 
property rights.112  The following is a summary of these arguments, and an 
analysis of their propriety when applied in light of recognized federal 
Indian law norms. 
As to the first question, Osage Wind cited the circuit split among 
federal courts of appeals over to how to best deal with entities appealing a 
district court decision where those entities were not parties to the 
underlying suit.113  Citing “a lack of uniformity that the federal system 
should not tolerate,” Osage Wind urged the Supreme Court to grant its 
petition in order to determine the best among the varying rules applied 
when deciding whether appeal by a nonparty is allowed.114  Osage Wind 
was critical of the Tenth Circuit’s rule, asserting its holding “encourages 
free-riders with an interest in litigation to sit back and rely on the efforts 
of other litigants rather than taking advantage of the tool provided by the 
Federal Rules: intervention.”115  In support of its argument, Osage Wind 
separated the split circuit courts’ rules into two categories, those that 
expand the court’s jurisdiction beyond the limits of other circuit courts, 
and those that do not.116  
                                                      
111.  Id. at ii. (“Petitioner Osage Wind, LLC is owned in part by Osage 
Wind Holdings, LLC, which is in turn owned by EFS Osage Wind, LLC and by 
petitioner Enel Kansas, LLC. Enel Kansas, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
petitioner Enel Green Power North America, which is in turn a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Enel Green Power, S.p.A., which is itself a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Enel S.p.A. In addition, JPM Capital Corporation, Dortmund, LLC, and Antrim Corp. 
each owns 10% or more of petitioner Osage Wind, LLC’s membership interests.”)  
112.  Id. at i. 
113.  Id. at 10. 
114.  Id.  
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. at 11 (“Put another way: some circuits have interpreted their own 
jurisdiction to be broader than that exercised by other circuits.”). 
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Osage Wind outlined the different approaches used by circuit 
courts in determining whether to permit nonparty appeals, referring to the 
“strict standard” of the First, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits,117 and the “more 
permissive” balancing-test approaches only used in “exceptional 
circumstances” by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.118  
In its petition, Osage Wind characterized the Tenth Circuit standard as a 
“relatively permissive” one, without outlining its requirements.119  In its 
decision below, the Tenth Circuit made a point to “emphasize the limited 
nature of [its] decision,” and held that OMC fit into the narrow exception 
allowing nonparty appeal because it demonstrated both “a particularized 
and significant stake” in the proceedings, and showed “cause for why 
[OMC] did not or could not intervene in the proceedings below.”120  By 
ignoring this detail in their petition, Osage Wind ignores the limited, 
unique circumstances in which the Tenth Circuit allows nonparty 
appeals.121  The United States brought suit on behalf of OMC in district 
court, first to enjoin and later to seek damages from Osage Wind for failure 
to secure a mining lease before beginning its excavation work.122  Those 
mining leases are issued by OMC, and then approved by the Secretary of 
the Interior.123  The amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General disagreed 
with Osage Wind’s contentions regarding a circuit split in need of 
Supreme Court resolution, and asserted “[t]here is no conflict in the courts 
of appeals on whether a nonparty may appeal under th[e] unique facts” 
present in OMC’s claims below.124 
Noticeably absent from Osage Wind’s petition was an 
examination of the relationship between the United States and the Osage 
Nation, and acknowledgment of the Nation’s ownership of the mineral 
                                                      
117.  Id. at 13–15. 
118.  Id. at 15–17. 
119.  Id. at 17. 
120.  Osage Wind II, 871 F.3d 1078, 1086 (10th Cir. 2017) (emphasis 
added). 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 1083. 
123.  Id. at 1082–83 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 214.7). 
124.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Osage Wind, LLC 
v. Osage Minerals Council, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
1237/74102/20181204150140415_17-1237%20Osage%20Wind%20AC%20Pet.pdf  
(U.S. Dec. 4, 2018) (No. 17-1237).               
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interest the United States brought suit to protect.125  The Tenth Circuit 
found OMC’s ownership to be the particularized and significant stake 
needed to permit OMC to appeal the district court judgment.126  Osage 
Wind, in its petition, characterized the Osage Nation’s participation in the 
lower court proceedings as nonexistent until the Nation appealed to the 
Tenth Circuit. 127   This contention displays a fundamental lack of 
understanding of the unique relationship between the United States and 
Indian nations, and the trust responsibility between the two.128  
Osage Wind’s second argument concerned the Tenth Circuit’s 
application of an Indian law canon of construction, which Osage Wind 
said was applied “[i]n conflict” with the Supreme Court and other circuit 
court decisions.129  After characterizing the Tenth Circuit’s application of 
an Indian canon to federal regulations as a means of “providing maximum 
financial benefit” to the Osage Nation, Osage Wind contended the more 
appropriate use of the canons was to determine congressional intent.130  
According to Osage Wind, Indian law canons do not permit courts to 
circumvent federal statutes and regulations in order to bestow benefits 
upon Indian tribes.131  Instead, the canons are more appropriately used to 
“avoid construing federal treaties and statutes to inadvertently diminish 
tribal sovereignty and rights, not to expand the rights of a tribe.”132  Osage 
Wind asserted that the Tenth Circuit found nonexistent ambiguity in 25 
C.F.R. § 211.3’s definition of “mining,” and too narrowly focused on that 
                                                      
125.  See id. 
126.  Osage Wind II, 871 F.3d at 1086. 
127.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Osage Wind, LLC v. United States, 
at 2, 11, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171237/37360/ 
20180302123736247_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf (U.S. 
March 2, 2018) (No. 17-1237). 
128.  See, e.g., HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“The federal government bears a special trust obligation to protect the interests of 
Indian tribes, including protecting tribal property and jurisdiction.” (citations 
omitted)). 
129.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Osage Wind, LLC v. United States, 
at 2, 11, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171237/37360 
/20180302123736247_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf (U.S. 
March 2, 2018) (No. 17-1237). 
130.  Id. at 23–24. 
131. Id. at 26. 
132.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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single regulation, rather than the entire regulatory scheme applicable to the 
Osage Nation’s mining leases.133  
There are several flaws apparent in Osage Wind’s arguments.  
First, 25 C.F.R. § 211.1 describes the purpose and scope of the regulations 
at issue, providing that the “regulations are intended to ensure that Indian 
mineral owners desiring to have their resources developed are assured that 
they will be developed in a manner that maximizes their best economic 
interests and minimizes any adverse environmental impacts or cultural 
impacts resulting from such development.”134  Rather than applying the 
Indian canons to interpret the regulations in a manner which “provides 
maximum financial benefit” to the Osage Nation, the Tenth Circuit likely 
derived any notions of protecting the financial interests of the Osage from 
the applicable regulations and the statutory mandate by which those 
regulations were promulgated.135  Moreover, if these regulations intended 
to exclude Osage mining leases issued for non-oil and gas development 
purposes, the BIA could have included Part 214 (“Leasing of Osage 
Reservation Lands, Oklahoma, for Mining, Except Oil and Gas”) in its 
exclusions listed in § 211.1(e).136  
According to Osage Wind, in interpreting 25 C.F.R. § 211.3, the 
Tenth Circuit erred by initially applying an Indian law canon to the 
regulation’s mining definition, instead of first “inquir[ing] as to the best 
reading of the regulatory definition, in light of the statutory provisions the 
regulation implements.”137  However, Osage Wind gave no support for its 
position that the Tenth Circuit’s analysis was disordered, other than 
characterizing the Tenth Circuit’s application of the Indian canon as “a 
departure” from the Supreme Court and other circuit courts’ use of the 
                                                      
133.  Id. at 25 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 214.10 (royalty payable on “minerals 
marketed”)). 
134.  25 C.F.R. § 211.1(a) (emphasis added). 
135.  Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, § 2, 52 Stat. 347, 347-48.  
136.  25 C.F.R. § 211.1(e) (“The regulations in this part do not apply to 
leasing and development governed by regulations in 25 C.F.R. parts 213 (Members of 
the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma), 226 [Leasing of Osage Reservation Lands for 
Oil and Gas Mining], or 227 (Wind River Reservation).”). 
137.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Osage Wind, LLC v. United States, 
at 23, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171237/37360/ 
20180302123736247_Petition%20for%20a%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf (U.S. 
March 2, 2018) (No. 17-1237).  
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canon. 138   Again, the Solicitor General disagreed with Osage Wind’s 
assertions regarding a circuit split, this time in Indian canon application: 
“[Osage Wind’s] contention that the [Tenth Circuit] created a circuit split 
by applying the Indian canon to interpret [DOI]’s regulations does not 
withstand scrutiny and presents no question of exceptional importance.”139  
Legislative history, subsequent committee reports, bill sponsor or drafter 
statements, deliberation, or other extrinsic evidence to determine 
congressional intent are—like the Indian canons—helpful tools employed 
by courts for statutory interpretation where ambiguity is found.140  Those 
tools’ utilization is not generally subject to a mandated hierarchy. 141  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged the 
distinctive nature of statutory interpretation where Indian law is involved, 
recognizing “that the standard principles of statutory construction do not 
have their usual force in cases involving Indian law.”142  
 Osage Wind’s lack of understanding of the trust responsibility 
between the United States and the Osage Nation is evident by its failure to 
properly consult with the Osage Nation before commencing the 
development of its wind farm.  Additionally, Osage Wind, LLC was 
formed by Enel Green North America, and the project “Osage Wind” takes 
its name from the tribe who ultimately opposes it.  This cultural 
                                                      
138.  Id. 
139.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Osage Wind, LLC 
v. Osage Minerals Council, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
1237/74102/20181204150140415_17-1237%20Osage%20Wind%20AC%20Pet.pdf  
(U.S. Dec. 4, 2018) (No. 17-1237).               
140. See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: 
Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations 
in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 824 (2010) (“Legislative history has 
long been a tool that courts have used . . . to search for indications of congressional 
intent.”).  
141.  Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of 
Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 (2003) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert 
M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1201 (tentative ed. 1958), reprinted in Henry M. Hart, 
Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip 
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no 
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory 
interpretation.”)). 
142.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 100, at 113 (quoting Montana v. 
Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). 
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appropriation further indicates the company’s deficient awareness of 
acceptable practices when pursuing development on Indian nations’ lands. 
 
IV. IMPORTANCE OF TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND ENERGY 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 In his recent book chronicling the Osage Nation’s oil history, and 
the crimes committed against the Osage people in pursuit of that oil and 
its revenues, author David Grann was urged to visit the area in Pawhuska, 
Oklahoma, where Osage Wind’s turbines tower over the landscape.143  
Grann quoted OMC second Chairwoman Kathryn Red Corn,144 who asked 
whether he noticed the turbines on his drive.145  She asked, “Did you see 
them?” and then exclaimed, “This company came in here and put them up 
without our permission.”146 
 This statement shows the lack of dialogue between Osage Wind 
and the Osage Nation prior to and throughout the wind farm’s 
construction, and it illustrates the importance of meaningful consultation 
with Indian nations when developing a renewable energy project within 
tribal reservation boundaries.  
The economic development potential in renewable energy 
investment is high for many tribes, 147  and a number of tribes have 
successfully implemented a range of renewable energy projects in hopes 
of providing sustainable, long-term economic development.148  In a 2017 
session of the National Tribal Energy Summit, U.S. Senator Tom Udall 
described the potential benefits renewable energy projects could bring to 
Indian nations: 
                                                      
143.  GRANN, supra note 7, at 277. 
144.  Minerals Council, THE OSAGE NATION, https://www.osagenation-
nsn.gov/who-we-are/minerals-council (last visited May 7, 2018). 
145.  GRANN, supra note 7, at 277. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Indian Energy and Economic Development: Renewable and 
Distributed Generation, BIA U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.bia.gov/as-
ia/ieed/division-energy-and-mineral-development/renewable-energy (last visited 
Dec. 8, 2018).  
148.  See Energy Department Selects 11 Tribal Communities to Deploy 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technologies, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 
(March 18, 2015), https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-selects-11-
tribal-communities-deploy-energy-efficiency-and-renewable. 
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The Department of Energy estimates that wind power 
from tribal lands could satisfy 32 percent of the total U.S. 
electricity demand. And solar production from Indian 
lands could generate enough energy to power the country 
two times over . . . Not only does this mean tribal energy 
independence. It also means economic growth. Tribes can 
produce and sell energy. It means stronger, more 
diversified economies. And it means lots of good paying 
jobs.149 
 
With the development potential high for tribes and the need for 
electricity generation ever-expanding, the question then comes to 
renewable energy investors, and how their companies can expand the 
renewable energy market while supporting tribal energy sovereignty 
through meaningful consultation.  For example, when discussing the facts 
of the case relevant to the public interest in Osage Nation ex rel. Osage 
Minerals Council v. Wind Capital Group, LLC, the district court 
mentioned employment and revenue data that would be generated by the 
wind farm’s construction, including “250 construction employees and 10-
12 permanent employees,” and a projection of “$20 million dollars in local 
tax revenues over 20 years.”150  
The federal government promulgates tribal consultation policies 
as a framework to guide its employees, Bureaus, and Offices on the 
government’s obligation to maintain effective communication with Indian 
tribes, and receive tribal input on actions that could affect them.151  These 
policies were outlined for executive departments and federal agencies first 
by Executive Order 13,175,152 and later by a Presidential Memorandum, 
which “charged [the agencies] with engaging in regular and meaningful 
consultation and collaboration with tribal officials in the development of 
                                                      
149.  Mark Wolf Renewable Energy Can be Key to Tribal Energy 
Development, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 3, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2017/05/03/renewable-energy-can-be-key-to-tribal-energy-
development.aspx. 
150.  Osage Wind I, 2011 WL at *6. 
151.  Tribal Consultation, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 75,879 (Nov. 9, 2009). 
152. Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000). 
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federal policies that have tribal implications,” and by making those 
agencies “responsible for strengthening the government-to-government 
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.”153  Under this 
Memorandum, each agency was required to submit its own 
implementation strategy of the consultation policies and directives, and 
then subsequently submit progress reports on the status of those 
directives.154  Each Department’s consultation policy and procedures can 
be found on their respective webpages.155  
While Osage Wind is a private company and not subject to the 
implementation of federal tribal consultation policies, these policies could 
still provide initial guidance on how to best involve Indian nations when 
pursuing development opportunities in Indian country.  For example, the 
Department of Energy mandates that its representatives and contractors 
“provid[e] for mutually agreed protocols for timely communication, 
coordination, cooperation, and collaboration to determine the impact on 
traditional and cultural lifeways, natural resources, treaty and other 
federally reserved rights involving appropriate tribal officials and 
representatives throughout the decision-making process.” 156   To be 
certain, these consultation policies and procedures are grounded in 
recognizing the trust responsibility between the federal government and 
Indian nations;157 however, were renewable energy companies to adopt 
their own consultation guidelines in dealing with Indian nations, they 
                                                      
153.  Tribal Consultation, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. at 75,879-75,880. 
154.  Id. 
155.  See, e.g., Office of Environmental Management, American Indian 
Policy and Relevant DOE and Executive Orders, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
https://www.energy.gov/em/services/communication-engagement/em-tribal-
programs-indian-country/american-indian-policy-and (last visited May 3, 2018); 
Tribal Consultation Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
https://www.doi.gov/tribes/Tribal-Consultation-Policy (last visited May 3, 2018); 
Tribal Consultation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/iea/tribal-affairs/consultation/index.html (last 
visited May 3, 2018). 
156.  American Indian Tribal Government Interactions and Policy, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE O 144.1, 9 (Nov. 6, 2009). 
157.  Id. at Attachment 2, 2 (“The most important doctrine derived from 
this [government-to-government] relationship is the trust responsibility of the United 
States to protect tribal sovereignty and self-determination, tribal lands, assets, 
resources, and treaty and other federally recognized and reserved rights.”). 
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could potentially avoid protracted and expensive litigation of the type seen 
in United States v. Osage Wind, LLC.  Importantly, it is up to Indian 
nations to individually determine what meaningful dialogue means to 
them, and whether engagement in consultation fits within their individual 
tribe’s nation building. 
It could be argued that the Osage Nation’s opposition to wind farm 
development was less about inadequate consultation, and more about the 
protection of its oil and gas assets.  However, as the trend toward 
renewable energy development continues to grow, so does the number of 
Indian nations seeking to diversify their economies by investing in 
renewable energy projects.158  
The potential in renewable energy investment for Indian nations 
is an exciting prospect.  Unlike gaming, which often relies upon proximity 
to urban populations,159 or mineral and timber development, which can 
only be pursued if those resources are available to a tribe, renewable 
energy development can be pursued by considerably more Indian 
nations. 160   Simply put, the sun shines and the wind blows almost 
everywhere.  Tribes could use these renewable resources as a base for their 
economic infrastructure, creating jobs, diversifying their economies, and 
making steps toward energy independence and assertions of sovereignty 
                                                      
158.  Sarah M. Stevenson & Walter E. Stern, Wind Energy: Challenged 
Under Federal Regulations, but More Native American Nations Appear to be 
Embracing its Development, MODRALL SPERLING (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.modrall.com/2016/02/24/wind-energy-challenged-under-federal-
regulations-but-more-native-american-nations-appear-to-be-embracing-its-
development/#_edn2 (“Modrall Sperling is one of the law firms representing Osage 
Wind, LLC, Enel Kansas, LLC, and Enel Green Power North America, Inc. in [United 
States v. Osage Wind, LLC].”). 
159.  Barbara Wells Native Americans Can’t Always Cash in on Casinos, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2010, 10:00 AM EDT) (“Since the [Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act], tribal gaming on some reservations has flourished where tribes have 
been lucky enough to be located near densely populated areas.”). 
160.  See Indian Energy and Economic Development, Renewable Energy, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/ieed/division-energy-and-
mineral-development/renewable-energy (last visited Apr. 30, 2018) (“For example, of 
the 325 American Indian reservations, more than 150 have the resource capacity 
needed to sustain a 1 to 25 megawatt renewable and/or natural gas power generation 
facility.”). 
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over their land and resources.161  “It must always be remembered that the 
various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and 
that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own 
Government.”162  Companies who wish to work with tribes to develop 
renewable energy projects must come to the bargaining table with this 
understanding, so that both parties may benefit to the fullest extent from 
their relationship. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide background information 
and historical context to the Osage Nation’s decades-long opposition to a 
wind farm development within its reservation boundaries.  By offering a 
realistic view of the Osage’s oil and gas interests, and not a romanticized 
view of Indian nations as protectors of land, it becomes apparent that 
energy sovereignty often means deciding what type of energy source may 
provide an economic anchor.  Understanding the inherent sovereignty that 
Indian nations possess, cultural preferences, and their need for energy 
independence, can help renewable energy companies seeking to assist 
tribes in developing their renewable energy resources. 
                                                      
161.  For information about how the federal government is assisting tribes 
who are interested in exploring renewable energy development, see id. 
162.  McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 162, 167 
(1973).  
